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Abstract
In developing economies, health shocks play a significant role in instigating and sustaining poverty. The
impact of high catastrophic out-of-pocket health expenditure also fosters a culture in which people
decide not to use services because they cannot afford either the direct costs, such as for health checkups or consultations, medicines or laboratory diagnostic tests, or the indirect costs, such as
transportation to the care provider or special food. The objective of this research is to investigate the
potential role of voluntary health insurance in India, particularly through a micro-finance framework to
reach the most destitute, bottom income quintiles of the population. Consumer Expenditure and
Healthcare and Morbidity data from the National Sample Survey Organization of India is used to analyze
mean and variance of health spending, projected risk premia, and variables that may predict levels of
health spending. Insurance for institutional health spending is potentially feasible given current market
demand across income quintiles, and sustainability of microinsurance offerings depends on increasing
population reach as well as efficient delivery.
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Introduction
Every year, an estimated 25 million households — more than 100 million people — are plunged
into poverty when they or their relatives become ill and they must struggle to pay for health-care
services out of their own pockets, according to the 2006 World Health Organization bulletin on health
care financing in developing countries (Braine, 2006). The goal of micro health insurance is to improve
the financial protection of the poor uninsured populations in developing countries against excessive
health expenditures. The impact of high catastrophic out-of-pocket health expenditure also fosters a
culture in which people decide not to use services because they cannot afford either the direct costs,
such as for health check-ups or consultations, medicines or laboratory diagnostic tests, or the indirect
costs, such as transportation to the care provider or special food (Schieber, Gottret, Fleisher, Leive,
2007). Furthermore, as a result, households can sink further into poverty due to the work loss as a
result of illness.
Microinsurance for health has shown promise in being able to provide catastrophic health
protection for the poor families in developing economies, and it is generally offered through microfinance institutions (MFI) that also offer other microcredit loans to individuals for small business
development (Dror et al. 2009). Due to lack of baseline and follow-up data collection, the success of
micro health insurance has generally been equated with the household’s ability to repay other
microcredit loans, and remain financially stable (Dror & Jacquier, 1999).

Research Focus
The focus of the research is to gauge the market for health insurance in India, particularly for
chronic and catastrophic health care benefits, through a micro-insurance model. The micro-insurance
model in particular should theoretically facilitate access to care and ability to pay among the lower
income quintiles in a country’s population. It is hypothesized that micro-insurance can significantly
decrease the currently high out-of-pocket health expenditures and serve to smooth risk and spending
levels among the target community populations.

Health Insurance in Developing Economies
Community-financing schemes as micro health insurance have developed as a result of the
context of two main failures in developing countries, in terms of catering to disadvantaged populations
(Preker et al., 2001). Firstly, most developing countries experience a government failure to collect taxes
and organize public finance, which in turn can provide social protection for disadvantaged populations.
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In addition, governments fail to employ oversight of the health sector in general, particularly in terms of
the lack of health care supply, both professionals and infrastructure, in rural areas where a large
proportion of the population reside. Secondly, there is the market failure on the economic end to
establish a functional exchange between supply and demand, due in part because of the gap between
needs, demand, and ability to pay, which in turn leads to a lower level of health care supplied (Schieber
& Maeda, 1997). It is also in part due to the prevalence of nonmonetary transactions in the informal
sector of the economy, particularly in rural, agriculturally-oriented regions (Schieber et al., 2007). In
India, approximately 78% of total medical spending is out of pocket, according to the 2005 World Health
Report (WHO, 2005).

Micro-Finance Framework
Micro-finance offerings for healthcare encapsulate credit loans for emergency health situations,
health savings accounts, and micro-insurance. Loans are typically not a viable offering among MFIs due
to the high default rate and consequent low sustainability (Schieber & Maeda, 1997). A medical savings
account mandates or encourages individuals to save and defines that the savings can only be spent for
health costs of the owner or family. However, medical savings accounts, offered through MFIs do not
facilitate risk pooling among income levels, health status levels or by age and gender groups. Also, the
protection available is limited to the balance of the savings. Microinsurance, referring to communityfunded health insurance schemes, is a mechanism for pooling resources and spreading risks across
income, age, gender, or health status differences of the entire group (Preker et al., 2001). The major
difference is that the responsibility for the health risk is placed exclusively on the beneficiary and his
family in the case of savings accounts, whereas microinsurance creates a system of complementary
responsibility of individuals and their community; and the focus of this microfinance analysis will be on
the latter.

Micro-Insurance
Evolving from this landscape of small credit offerings is microinsurance, birthed from the
presence of social capital – when hardships surface, family and community often serve as the sole safety
net for low-income populations. In addition, low-income families often hold greater trust in community
organizations and feel more confident contributing to a community-based financing program, which has
an established positive track record for local impact, rather than to one that operates a broad-based
national or regional (state or provincial) health insurance scheme.
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The “micro” aspect refers to the smaller pool that micro-finance must work with, at a
community level. Ideally, insurers want a larger pool because size adds viability. However, in
developing countries, health insurers in reality do not want to include poverty-stricken population
segments in larger pools, due to lower income, higher health risk, and higher default rates. In addition,
the social structure has excluded disadvantaged populations from access to larger schemes (Dror,
Radermacher, Koren, 2007). As a result of these two constraints, microinsurance units operate to give
the target destitute population to express its needs and priorities in terms of offerings, and also strive to
develop a positive opinion toward insurance. The consulting process is essential to the concept of group
involvement in self-management that is pivotal in microfinance offerings; the community’s and its
individual members’ interests are correlated. Hence, a successful microinsurer must work with the
population and the members’ priorities, rather than simply providing financial resources. This also helps
to build trust and maintain the microinsurance system as a socially and community-rooted organization,
rather than one that is responding to an external insurer’s profit motives. This in turn would lead to a
larger continued membership, theoretically, which generates more resources than a smaller one,
enabling the group to cover expenses that a single individual could not afford.

Study Data and Methods
The dataset used is the 2004 Indian National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) survey data on
Household Consumer Expenditure (Schedule 1.0) and Morbidity and Healthcare (Schedule 25.0).
Previous research used the World Health Survey (WHS) Datasets for select developing countries to
determine the potential for health insurance. However, the main limitation of WHS data for India is the
lack of month-to-month and annual health expenses, which is necessary for a predicted measure of
variance in spending. The sampling was also limited in regions and number of households surveyed.
Previously and in this research, the annual measure is simulated to be 12 times monthly expenditures,
which assumes a variance for the distribution. In the NSSO Morbidity and Healthcare dataset,
individuals’ self-reported health status and disease condition is available. This can be used to determine
the demand for insurance for chronic conditions as well as the potential for catastrophic coverage.
The final household-level data sets combines information on household health spending, total
spending, and demographic and health information on the household survey respondent as well as from
other individuals in the household. All expenditures are at a household level; individual health spending
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or individual total spending is not available, except for hospitalizations resulting from specific ailments,
which is available in the Healthcare and Morbidity dataset.
The analyses require an income measure, because health spending in developing countries has
been shown to vary by income segment (Pauly, Blavin, Meghan, 2009). Due to data limitations of
wealth indication measures (e.g. ownership of a bicyucle, home, and so forth), the NSSO analysis for
India delineates income based on a spending based definition. This is defined to be total actual
consumption less actual medical care spending for each household. This serves to stratify the
population by income quintiles. Health expenditure data is the second piece, in which monthly and/or
biweekly data is compared with the annual reported values or estimates, to subsequently calculate the
projected insurance premium. Health spending is available for inpatient, outpatient, and outpatient
drug expenses. The insurance premium calculation is used to gauge whether there is a demand for
insurance, through a comparison to current out-of-pocket expenditures.
Risk Premium Calculation
𝑟 𝐼

Risk premium ≈ 0.5 × 𝐼 × 𝜎 2
Where r(I) is the relative risk-aversion coefficient, I is income, and σ2 (the square of the standard
deviation σ) is the variance of the residual for the risky distribution (Phelps, 2003).
In order to identify which segments of a population have higher levels of drug spending,
regression models are generated. Drug spending in a 30-day period (Schedule 1.0 Consumer
Expenditure dataset) was regressed by income quintiles, region (urban or rural), the presence of an
elderly person (elderly defined as age greater than 59 years), number of children (age less than 17
years), household size, and whether or not there was a hospitalization in the past 365 days. Drug
spending in a 15-day period (Schedule 25.0 Health Care and Morbidity Dataset) was regressed by
income quintiles, region, marital status (single or partner), education level, gender, age groups, and selfreported specific ailments – that either (1) were present during the past 15 days or (2) led to
hospitalization during the last 365 days.

Results
Analysis of annual mean income (spending-based definition) and health expenditure ($ PPP) for
inpatient care and non-institutional expenses resulted in average expenditures that are positive for all
income quintiles, as shown in Exhibit 1. The share of spending by the bottom 80% of households on the
basis of income is 42% for inpatient medical expenses, 57% for non-institutional medical expenses, 58%
for drugs, and 55% for physician fees. The share of spending by the bottom 40% of households on the
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basis of income is 10% for inpatient medical expenses, 17% for non-institutional medical expenses, 18%
for drugs, and 16% for physician fees. For the first income quintile, the average income is 1483($ PPP)
and the inpatient medical expenses was 17, non-institutional medical expenses is 52 overall, and within
which is 45 for drugs, and 5 for physician fees. For the second income quintile, the average income is
2541($ PPP) and the inpatient medical expenses is 25, non-institutional medical expenses is 109 overall,
and within which is 93 for drugs, and 11 for physician fees.
Exhibit 1
Annual Mean Income and Health Spending ($ PPP) for Inpatient Medical Expenses, NonInstitutional Medical Expenses, Prescription Drugs, and Physician Fees in All Households

Note: PPP is purchasing power parity.

The calculated risk premium is determined based on the mean spending, the variance of
spending, and the coefficient of risk aversion enumerated as 2.0. Represented as a percentage of the
mean health spending, the market demand for feasible insurance can be delineated. The theory of
insurance demand predicts that risk-averse households will voluntarily opt for insurance if it can be
offered to them at a premium whose excess over the expected expenses is smaller than the “risk
premium” they would be willing to pay (Phelps, 2003). As a percentage of mean spending, the risk
premium for the entire population, across income quintiles is 227% for inpatient medical expenses, 35%
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for non-institutional medical expenses, within which it is calculated to be 29% for drugs only, and 10%
for physician fees only, as shown in Exhibit 2. This pattern of a feasible percentage for inpatient medical
expenses and low percentage and market potential for non-institutional expenses (drugs and physician
fees) is paralleled for the bottom two income quintiles, for which it is 260% and 89% for inpatient
medical spending, 46% and 44% for non-institutional spending, 39% and 40% for drugs only, and 13%
and 9% for physician fees only, for the first and second income quintiles respectively.
Exhibit 2
Annual Calculated Risk Premium ($ PPP) for Inpatient Medical Expenses, Non-Institutional Medical
Expenses, Prescription Drugs, and Physician Fees in All Households

Note: PPP is purchasing power parity.

To further investigate the potential role of insurance coverage for drug spending, 30-day drug
spending was regressed by household attributes that might increase the predisposition for higher level
of expenses: regional situation (urban or rural), presence of an elderly person (defined as 60 years and
older), number of children (defined as less than 17 years), number of household members, and whether
there was a hospitalization in the past 365 days. In the Consumer Expenditure survey, in the final
dataset, 11,914 households report 0 drug spending in the past 30 days. A probit regression was first
used to model this spending distribution to control for the high number of households with no drug
expenditures. All explanatory variables are significant. Geographic situation in a rural area is significant
with a coefficient of -0.09, standard error of 0.02 and z-statistic of -5.45, meaning that the drug spending
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is predicted to be higher if a household is in a rural region. Presence of elderly is significant with a
coefficient of 0.25, standard error of 0.02, and z-statistic was 14.35. Number of children is significant
with a coefficient of -0.02, standard error of 0.01 and z-statistic of -3.21. Household size is significant
and has a coefficient of 0.03 with a standard error of 0.01 and z-statistic of 5.31. Hospitalization is
significant with a coefficient of -0.05, standard error of 0.02, and z-statistic of -2.16.
Exhibit 3
Probit Regression ($ PPP) for 30-day Drug Spending in All Households:
Effects of Income, Region, Household Age Structure, and Hospitalization

Note: PPP is purchasing power parity.

Following up the probit regression, an OLS regression model was built including only those
households with positive drug spending. Parallel to the earlier model, all explanatory variables in the
models are significant. Approximately 42% of households included in the models have a predicted level
of drug spending higher than the actual mean spending during the 30-day period, as shown in Exhibit 4.
Geographic situation in a rural area is significant with a coefficient of -134, standard error of 43 and zstatistic of -3.1, meaning that the drug spending is predicted to be higher if a household is in a rural
region. Presence of elderly is significant with a coefficient of 311, standard error of 42, and z-statistic
was 7.3. Number of children is significant with a coefficient of -47, standard error of 17 and z-statistic of

Wharton Research Scholars 2010

Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania

Micro-Finance Health Insurance

Meghan 9

-2.7. Household size is significant and has a coefficient of 32 with a standard error of 12 and z-statistic
of 2.7. Hospitalization is significant with a coefficient of 624, standard error of 55, and z-statistic of 11.3.
The main discrepancy between the probit and OLS regression models, including and excluding
households with no drug spending, respectively, is the coefficient of hospitalization, which is negative
and significant when households with no drug spending are included, and positive and significant when
only positive-spending households are included.
Exhibit 4
OLS Regression for 30-day Drug Spending in Households with Positive Drug Spending:
Effects of Income, Region, Household Age Structure, and Hospitalization

The Healthcare and Morbidity (Schedule 25.0) dataset provides information on specific health
ailments of individuals in the household. Health spending was regressed by socio-demographic controls
(income, age, household size, urban sector, education level, gender) and followed by models that
included the specific ailments and whether (Model 1) the ailment existed in the past 15 days, and
(Model 2) whether the ailment led to hospitalization in the past 365 days, as shown in Exhibit 5. This
analysis highlights that ailments found to be significant can also often be categorized as chronic or
accidental cases.

Wharton Research Scholars 2010

Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania

Micro-Finance Health Insurance

Meghan 10

Exhibit 5
OLS Regression ($ PPP) for Annual Out-of-Pocket Hospital Spending in All Households for Specific
Ailments and Consequent Hospitalizations During the Last 365 Days
Model 1: Controls Added for Specific
Ailments in HH During Last 15 Days
Coef.
R-Squared

Std. Err

t-stat

Model 2: Controls Added Specific
Ailments in HH that Led to Hospitalization
During Last 365 Days
Coef.

0.0339

t-stat

0.1673

Adjusted R-Squared

0.1667

Root MSE
Inc. Quintile 1

Std. Err

828.35
-16.6

769.03

10.9

-1.5

-6.1

10.2

-0.6

Inc. Quintile 2

-3.5

9.9

-0.4

-0.1

9.2

0.0

Inc. Quintile 4

40.6

10.0

4.0

18.0

9.3

1.9

Inc. Quintile 5

152.0

11.8

12.9

100.3

11.0

9.2

3.5

1.6

2.2

-0.6

1.5

-0.4

Household Size
Urban Sector

-10.5

7.9

-1.3

-8.0

7.3

-1.1

Single

-0.4

10.8

0.0

19.9

10.0

2.0

Edu. Level 0

-30.8

7.9

-3.9

-2.3

7.4

-0.3

Edu. Level 1

-19.8

10.8

-1.8

-11.1

10.0

-1.1

Edu. Level 3

18.3

10.4

1.8

34.1

9.7

3.5

Edu. Level 4

59.4

13.6

4.4

91.7

12.6

7.3

Male 18-34

1.9

8.5

0.2

2.3

7.9

0.3

Male >49

44.7

7.7

5.8

19.3

7.1

2.7

Female 18-34

9.8

24.3

0.4

10.2

22.5

0.5

Female 34-49

30.1

18.2

1.7

14.9

16.9

0.9

Female >49

38.0

17.0

2.2

2.2

15.7

0.1

Diarrhoea/ dysentery

-14.9

21.3

-0.7

134.0

30.6

4.4

Gastritis/ulcer

22.3

24.4

0.9

584.5

38.8

15.1

Worm infestation

-35.6

72.8

-0.5

457.6

125.6

3.6

Amoebiosis

-75.9

75.1

-1.0

263.4

142.8

1.8

Hepatitis/Jaundice

106.1

68.3

1.6

772.1

63.1

12.2

Heart disease

627.7

28.7

21.9

2217.2

38.1

58.1

Hypertension

52.5

21.4

2.5

953.5

55.7

17.1

Respiratory

15.6

19.2

0.8

552.8

48.4

11.4

Tuberculosis

286.3

42.5

6.7

840.7

55.0

15.3

Bronchial asthma

74.5

24.4

3.1

450.1

49.8

9.0

Joints and bones

59.4

18.8

3.2

1095.0

51.8

21.2

Kidney/urinary system

558.1

46.1

12.1

1331.6

41.5

32.1

Prostatic disorders

294.3

127.5

2.3

1580.7

131.0

12.1

Gynecological disorders

144.0

41.4

3.5

847.0

35.3

24.0

Neurological disorders

326.7

32.5

10.1

1448.8

48.5

29.9
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Model 1: Controls Added for Specific
Ailments in HH During Last 15 Days

Model 2: Controls Added Specific
Ailments in HH that Led to Hospitalization
During Last 365 Days

Coef.

Std. Err

t-stat

Coef.

Std. Err

t-stat

Psychiatric disorders

117.4

56.0

2.1

777.1

89.2

8.7

Conjunctivitis

116.1

69.8

1.7

559.2

179.9

3.1

Glaucoma

111.0

88.5

1.3

524.6

112.0

4.7

Cataract

-38.3

37.1

-1.0

291.5

48.2

6.1

0.8

32.4

0.0

528.6

105.4

5.0

Goitre

-19.3

133.8

-0.1

421.8

259.0

1.6

Diabetes mellitus

135.3

25.7

5.3

730.6

65.1

11.2

Under-nutrition

-59.0

129.1

-0.5

275.6

283.6

1.0

Anaemia

9.5

69.3

0.1

363.2

84.7

4.3

STDs

16.8

181.2

0.1

852.1

237.3

3.6

Malaria

0.7

36.5

0.0

279.7

45.1

6.2

Eruptive

61.5

76.0

0.8

402.3

172.9

2.3

Mumps

-111.3

95.7

-1.2

146.7

316.8

0.5

Diphtheria

-7.6

119.9

-0.1

641.0

170.4

3.8

Whooping cough

-9.6

30.9

-0.3

225.7

103.3

2.2

Fever of unknown origin

-14.3

11.9

-1.2

238.1

30.6

7.8

Tetanus

-7.7

247.0

0.0

1122.4

160.8

7.0

Filariasis/Elephantiasis

-22.2

130.4

-0.2

349.3

217.0

1.6

Locomotor

28.2

34.3

0.8

1085.1

79.8

13.6

Visual including blindness
(excluding cataract)
Speech

-22.4

45.1

-0.5

323.9

126.8

2.6

-65.8

89.7

-0.7

545.9

322.1

1.7

Hearing

-14.5

47.5

-0.3

1086.9

204.0

5.3

Diseases of
Mouth/Teeth/Gum
Accidents/Injuries/Burns/
Fractures/Poisoning
Cancer and other
tumours
Other diagnosed
ailments
Other undiagnosed
ailments
_cons

-87.4

46.4

-1.9

687.1

163.2

4.2

258.3

28.1

9.2

1049.3

26.5

39.6

1440.8

62.8

23.0

2385.6

56.1

42.5

57.6

13.1

4.4

748.7

20.8

36.0

-2.4

29.5

-0.1

504.4

66.7

7.6

16.6

12.8

1.3

-24.0

11.8

-2.0

Diseases of skin

Note: PPP is purchasing power parity.

Due to data limitations, certain categorical nomenclature such as “Diseases of skin” is not
discrete enough to classify as chronic or acute (e.g. skin diseases can be skin cancer or eczema).
However, of those variables that are significant in the model to consider in-patient hospital spending
and hospitalization resulting from the health condition, the following ailments can be noted as chronic:
heart disease (z-stat = 58.1), hypertension (z-stat = 17.1), tuberculosis (z-stat = 15.3), bronchial asthma
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(z-stat = 9.0), disorders of joints and bones (z-stat = 21.2), disease of kidney/urinary system (z-stat =
32.1), prostatic disorders (z-stat = 12.1), neurological disorders (z-stat = 29.9), psychiatric disorders (zstat = 8.7), diabetes mellitus (z-stat = 11.2), cancers and other tumours (z-stat = 42.5). In addition,
catastrophic health conditions were also found to be significant in the model for hospitalizations in the
past 365 days, and is categorized under “accidents/injuries/burns/fractures/poisoning” (z-stat = 39.6).

Conclusions
The household data are first stratified by income quintiles on the basis of total household
monthly expenditures less health spending. This generates analysis that will consider financial
demarcations. Spending has been shown to vary with income; therefore, insurance should be
segmented by income (Pauly, Blavin, Meghan, 2009). There are three main facets that have emerged
from the analysis: (1) there is positive health spending, (2) the association between health spending and
household demographic attributes, and (3) the association between health spending and specific health
ailments.
Based on the Consumer Expenditure household survey, the share of spending by the bottom
40% of households on the basis of income is 10% for inpatient medical expenses, 17% for noninstitutional medical expenses, 18% for drugs, and 16% for physician fees. For the first income quintile,
the average income was 1483($ PPP) and the inpatient medical expenses was 17, non-institutional
medical expenses was 52 overall, and within which was 45 for drugs, and 5 for physician fees. For the
second income quintile, the average income was 2541($ PPP) and the inpatient medical expenses was
25, non-institutional medical expenses was 109 overall, and within which was 93 for drugs, and 11 for
physician fees. The data analysis of the Consumer Expenditure household survey showcases that
positive health spending exists, across income groups, including the bottom two quintiles.
The risk premium calculation, derived from the mean expenditure and variance, based on a risk
aversion coefficient of 2 provides a theoretical projection of insurance premium. Alan Garber and
Charles Phelps have identified that a risk-aversion coefficient of 2.0 represents the central tendency of
estimates generated from insurance studies (Garber and Phelps, 1997). The risk premium is then
measured as a percentage of the mean expenditure in order to determine if feasibly offered insurance
will be demanded. The theory of insurance demand predicts that risk-averse households will voluntarily
opt for insurance if it can be offered to them at a premium whose excess over the expected expenses is
smaller than the “risk premium” they would be willing to pay (Phelps, 2003). As a percentage of mean
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spending, the risk premium for the entire population, across income quintiles is 227% for inpatient
medical expenses, 35% for non-institutional medical expenses, within which it is calculated to be 29%
for drugs only, and 10% for physician fees only. This pattern of a feasible percentage for inpatient
medical expenses and low percentage and market potential for non-institutional expenses (drugs and
physician fees) is paralleled for the bottom two income quintiles, suggesting that there is market
demand for insurance that covers inpatient hospital care but less demand due to low variance of
expenses for non-institutional expenses, namely prescription drugs and outpatient physician fees. The
risk premium is determined based on the variance of the losses that the insurance will be able to cover
as well as the household’s risk aversion. Demand for insurance will be low if variance of the losses is
small or if the administrative “loading” (amount charged that does not provide for medical expense
reimbursement but rather serves to compensate the offering and processing of insurance) in excess of
the premium is high (Pauly and Zweifel, 2006). This is one of the main reasons that insurance must be
offered and operated in an efficient manner. Micro health insurance in particular can benefit from the
financial knowledge and operating proficiencies of more experienced financial institutions.
The market potential for drug insurance was further investigated through regression models of
30-day drug spending by geographic household situation (urban or rural), the presence of elderly
(greater than 59 years), number of children (less than 17 years), household size, and whether there was
a hospitalization during the last year. The probit regression was first modelled to control for the high
number of households that reported zero drug spending (11,914 households). Following this model, an
OLS regression model was built, which included the sample of only households with positive drug
spending. The main discrepancy between the probit and OLS regression models, including and excluding
households with zero drug spending, respectively, is the coefficient of hospitalization, which is negative
and significant when households with no drug spending are included, and positive and significant when
only positive-spending households are included. Hospitalization is however, generally not a predictive
variable in an insurance model (it cannot be known if a household will have a member hospitalized or
not in any given year, though it may be suggested from other factors such as a specific health condition).
Therefore, the role of hospitalization in this model was to serve the purpose of identifying whether
follow-up care through drugs was administered as a result of a hospitalization; in the OLS model,
hospitalization is significant with a coefficient of 624, standard error of 55, and z-statistic of 11.3.
In the OLS regression model which includes only those households with positive drug spending,
all household explanatory variables in the models are found to be significant. Approximately 42% of
households included in the models have a predicted level of drug spending higher than the actual mean
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spending during the 30-day period. Geographic situation in a rural area is significant with a coefficient
of -134, standard error of 43 and z-statistic of -3.1, meaning that the drug spending is predicted to be
higher if a household is in a rural region. The reasoning for this is unclear but can be explained
potentially by the categorization of drugs and whether homeopathic or ayurvedic drugs, which are more
prevalent in less formal, more rural areas in India are categorized as drugs (Kent et al., 2006). In
addition, due to the lower levels of pharmaceutical infrastructure in rural areas, both in terms of
availability as well as quality (and authenticity), greater expenditures may not necessarily equate to
higher levels of health outcomes (Peters et al., 2002). Presence of elderly is significant with a coefficient
of 311, standard error of 42, and z-statistic was 7.3; this can be explained by the increased health
complications that result from old age, including increased vulnerability but also greater immobility to
access care. Number of children is significant with a coefficient of -47, standard error of 17 and zstatistic of -2.7, suggesting that households with greater number of children have lower drug spending.
While this may seem contrary to intuition, it can be explained by two main underlying aspects. Firstly,
greater number of children may be a predictor of a household’s socio-economic status, including
consideration for the household’s primary occupation, such as one that is more labor intensive and can
benefit from more number of people. As well, more number of children may also reflect the limited
access to birth control or other health and social services (Peters et al., 2002). Secondly, there may be a
substitution effect in terms of allocation of finite financial resources with greater number of children to
care for, which may crowd out drug spending. Household size is significant and has a coefficient of 32
with a standard error of 12 and z-statistic of 2.7; this is parallel to household size and subsequent risk
premiums paid and drug spending in developed economies as well (Dror, Radermacher and Koren,
2007).
The Healthcare and Morbidity dataset offers information on individuals’ health ailments that
were present during the past 15 days, as well as whether they led to a hospitalization in the past 365
days. These variables were included in a model to predict in-patient hospital spending at an annual
level. Data limitations from the original dataset constrains the degree to which each health ailment can
be classified as chronic, acute, minor, or catastrophic. For example, certain categorical nomenclature
such as “Diseases of skin” is not discrete enough to classify as chronic or acute (e.g. skin diseases can be
skin cancer or eczema). Basic medical knowledge as well as the World Health Organization’s
categorization of health ailments was used to confirm certain health conditions as chronic as related to
health spending (WHO, 2000). Based on this elementary classification, of those variables that are
significant in the model to consider in-patient hospital spending and hospitalization resulting from the
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health condition, the following ailments can be noted as chronic: heart disease (z-stat = 58.1),
hypertension (z-stat = 17.1), tuberculosis (z-stat = 15.3), bronchial asthma (z-stat = 9.0), disorders of
joints and bones (z-stat = 21.2), disease of kidney/urinary system (z-stat = 32.1), prostatic disorders (zstat = 12.1), neurological disorders (z-stat = 29.9), psychiatric disorders (z-stat = 8.7), diabetes mellitus
(z-stat = 11.2), cancers and other tumours (z-stat = 42.5). In addition, catastrophic health conditions
were also found to be significant in the model for hospitalizations in the past 365 days, and is
categorized under “accidents/injuries/burns/fractures/poisoning” (z-stat = 39.6). These findings suggest
that a framework for offering health insurance would be particularly attractive from a demand
standpoint for those households with individuals with a chronic health condition. In addition, as
supported by the mean health spending analyses as well as the projected insurance risk premium
measures based on the variance of spending, catastrophic health insurance coverage also holds market
potential.

Microfinance Framework
Improved access to care can guide improved quality of care, which in turn can lead to better
health outcomes. Improved health can lead to positive economic outcomes for households. Coverage
of medical expenditures that result from catastrophic health shocks through micro-health insurance can
prevent people from selling off productive assets, depleting savings, and reducing spending and
investments in children’s health and education in order to afford health spending. By ensuring that the
medical expenditures are paid, micro-health insurance can facilitate allocation of financial resources so
that households can make other alternate and additional investments, which will contribute to asset
accumulation and earnings.
The microfinance framework could facilitate health insurance through local community
organizations and this would enable reach to informal sectors of the economy as well as more rural
regions in which the financial infrastructure of banking and insurance has not been established.
Furthermore, microinsurance can leverage the social capital that exists in smaller and more destitute
communities, which would ease adoption of the insurance concept. Otherwise, the concept of paying
an upfront premium for future financial protection is not a wholly known or accepted concept (Dror et
al., 2007).

Future Direction
A risk premium based on monthly household health spending data, relative to household
monthly income or total consumption expenditures, can serve as an upper bound for risk premia for a
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longer duration; this is because the variance of spending relative to the mean should decline as longer
time periods are considered. This line of thought assumes that the month-to-month expenses for a
household are not perfectly correlated. Given this, the aim would be to estimate health spending,
particularly drug expenditures, for which the current analysis suggests that insurance would not be
feasible from a market demand perspective, at a longer time scale, such as an annual measure.
Current analysis suggests that drug insurance is not feasible because the premia are too low
given a low variance in spending. It would therefore also be essential to identify socio-demographic and
other household attributes that might potentially increase a household’s predisposition to higher levels
of drug spending, thereby identify those household segments for which insurance would be viable. The
sample can be stratified on the basis of income, presence of elderly persons, number of children,
household size, region (urban or rural), and specific health ailments, for those households that have a
significantly high level of drug spending. Catastrophic health expenditure is defined with respect to the
households’ ability to pay. Health spending is classified as catastrophic when a household must reduce
its basic expenses over a certain period of time in order to cope with the medical bills of one or more of
its members. WHO proposes that health expenditure should be categorized as catastrophic whenever it
is greater than or equal to 40% of the capacity to pay. Catastrophic health expenditure is only observed
when households need and use health services; therefore, only households with positive health
spending can be analyzed, because access (though potentially limited in quality and quantity and
geographical or financial barriers), at least to a certain extent, can be assumed.
Annual spending can be estimated by taking each month of spending within an income quintle
as an independent draw and defining the probability of a high expense in following months as low if the
survey month expense is high. With the health ailments data, households can be categorized as having
a chronic condition present or not, and the subsequent risk premia for those two segments can be
calculated. Those households with chronic conditions can have a higher probability of a higher expense
in subsequent months, and at an annual level (12 times survey month expenditure) and total spending
for the rest of the sample can be simulated on the basis of independence between months. This would
be stratified and regressed within different income brackets (classified on a total consumption without
health spending basis).

Policy Implications

Wharton Research Scholars 2010

Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania

Micro-Finance Health Insurance

Meghan 17

Health insurance is one of the most important policy issues today in the developing world.
Developing countries suffer 90% of the global disease burden but represent only 12% of the world’s
spending on health care (Wagstaff and Pradhan, 2005). More than half of health expenditures in poor
countries are out-of-pocket payments by individual households. Health shocks and associated high
medical expenses can cause destitute families to sell productive assets, such as agriculture necessary for
earning a livelihood, or reduce consumption to the point where economic wellbeing is endangered and
the famiy’s health and children’s educational opportunities are compromised (Gottret and Schieber,
2006).
There are two main branches of policy considerations to be analyzed: first, the market
consequences of a household-level demand for insurance, and second, given a demand for health
insurance, economically efficient strategies that will facilitate building a sustainable supply of
microinsurance for health care.

Demand for Voluntary Health Insurance
The primary focus of this research is to determine the current level and variance of health
spending in developing economies, in order to illustrate the current spending patterns. This would
imply that there is a role for insurance because if households already spend on healthcare, they would
be able to instead pay a small insurance premium. In addition, if there is sufficient variation in spending,
individuals would benefit from risk and consumption smoothing over a time period. As such, a case can
be made for catastrophic healthcare coverage. In addition, if a household currently expends a certain
level of spending for health, then this further suggests that healthcare is a necessity and is demanded, as
would be the situation for health insurance for chronic conditions.

Strategies for Offering Microinsurance
There are various issues that have either hindered the growth of microinsurance’s client base,
the efficacy of the health care received, as well as the types of health services that can be covered. This
analysis will examine strategies that would improve the model of micro health insurance in terms of its
penetration, value to insured clients, and sustainability. The primary focus moving forward would be to
increase the population reach; this would facilitate greater number of people being provided with some
level of financial health protection, and thereby also enlarge the risk pool.
Reinsurance of Microinsurers
Reinsurance of MFIs is based on the underlying idea that the insurers are able to underwrite
risk. It addresses the two main issues of a small risk pool as well as the shortage of reserve capital that
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micro-insurers often face, threatening their sustainability and efficiency. Micro-insurance units are
rarely able to represent a perfectly balanced portfolio, between risk and return, either because their
client volume is too small (either due to enrollment demand or capacity), or because the relatively large
risks they cover among low-income populations represents a disproportionate impact on the portfolio
as a whole. In addition, various related insured events can result in a chain of losses with a compounded
effect on the micro-insurer. As a result of such adverse events, the balance of insured risks in the
insurer’s portfolio is disrupted, and that consequently leads to discrepancies between the initial,
probability-based forecast and the actual gross results (Dror, 2001).
The four functions of reinsurance are all applicable to community-based health insurance funds:
financing, capacity, stabilization of loss experience, and underwriting assistance (Dror, 2001). From a
financing perspective, reinsurance defines the amount of capital available to direct the insurance
company to establish retention limits. In terms of capacity, the coverage of large sums and highly
exposed risks may require a limiting size of some accepted risks, by setting up boundaries for each type
of risk, scaled down by the nature, severity, and past experience. On a per risk basis, loss stabilization is
achieved by calculating the risk of fluctuation and the risk of error in loss experience; on a per
occurrence basis, loss experience is potentially stabilized by calculating the probability of a company’s
risk of ruin by assuming a catastrophic event. On the lines of underwriting, a key issue is the lack of
expertise, which results in failing to establish optimal retention limits (Dror, 2001).
The reinsurance model works on the theoretical basis of the law of large numbers and
consequent risk smoothing. The microinsurer pays the reinsurer a periodic premium, and in exchange,
the reinsurer pays the microinsurer for costs exceeding a specified reinsurance threshold (Dror, 2001).
Such reinsurance offers the micro-insurer the advantage of protection against the risk of bankruptcy in
bad years and it also releases the microinsurer from unexpected fluctuations in expenses. Therefore,
since reinsurance removes the microinsurer’s obligation to maintain contingency funds, this allows the
surpluses generated by the microinsurer in good years to be reinvested at its own discretion (Haggerty &
Reid, 2002). This would facilitate investment in consulting and financial advising services, health
education for the microinsurer clients or to build partnerships with health care providers in the region.
The Governmental Role
The penetration of micro-insurance is very low currently in India. An empirically calculated
demand for health insurance among disadvantaged population segments could implicate a need for
government and private insurers to enter the market. In addition, this would provide greater support
for government subsidy in the form of a rural or social sector mandate for private insurers through the
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Insurance Regulation and Development Authority (IRDA). Such a rural sector obligation has been
proposed and implemented in India beginning in 2002, in which the mandate for life insurers is that in
1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th year the total number of policies written from ‘rural sector’ be 7, 9, 12, 14, 16 per
cent respectively. In the case of the general insurer, the obligation is to underwrite 2, 3, and 5 per cent
of total gross premium income from the ‘rural sector’ in the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd financial year respectively
(IRDA, 2008).
In addition, given the emergence of state-sponsored health schemes, microinsurance could
serve as an extension of this arm, to reach the bottom income quintiles in an efficient manner. The fit
with government schemes would also include complementary benefits to ensure that health care
services coverage is not duplicated and is offered most efficiently. The calculated risk premiums can
contribute to gauging the sustainability of micro-insurance units and whether micro-insurance is in fact
a feasible initiative in the long run. Currently, due to the small risk pool, micro-insurance requires
subsidies to compensate during bad insurance years (negative profits); in this scenario, if there is
demand for micro-insurance, reinsurance may be an important avenue to explore.
A basic level of coverage, for catastrophic health expenditures at least, could potentially
motivate the government or non-governmental organizations to invest in health care infrastructure,
including facilities and health professionals, particularly in rural areas where access is limited. Health
care in rural India is sparse, in part, due to people’s inability to pay and subsequent low awareness or
interest in formal health care services. This is further exacerbated either due to high default of bill rates
as a result of low income, or low demand for care in fear of high medical expenses (Kent et al., 2006).
Partnerships with health providers could be established in the short term to ensure that there is a
supply of care available.
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